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 FROM AVERSION TO ACCEPTANCE :                                                                                                
EVOLUTION OF THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA 
By: Siraj Shaik Aziz 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the evolution of ASEAN’s attitude towards human rights 
from one of aversion on the premise of cultural relativism to the acceptance of its 
universality as demonstrated by the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. In doing so, it also examines the veracity of cultural relativist 
objection to universality of human rights. The paper then examines the obstacles 
that militate against ensuring institutionalisation on the ground via the rule of law. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
ASEAN sits at the crossroads as it ushers in a landmark moment in its history by making a 
formal commitment to protecting and promoting human rights in the form of the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration. This, despite major misgivings from some quarters, is a major step forward 
for a region more diverse socially, economically and politically than any other regional bloc and 
for one whose historical relationship with human rights has been marked more by aversion than 
amenability. That no ASEAN country has ratified all twenty-six international instruments of 
human rights, while only two ASEAN countries (Cambodia and the Philippines) have ratified all 
six major human rights conventions is testament to this reality. 
At this point, as one projects whether ASEAN will live up to delivering on safeguarding 
universal standards of human rights or succumb to its politico-cultural peculiarities and sink back 
into the cultural relativist dogma of the 1990s, one needs to heed the warning of the Statement on 
Human Rights by the American Anthropological Association (AAA) about the need to be 
cognizant of the fact of cultural pluralism.
1
 The question that ought to be asked then is the 
following; does the fact of cultural pluralism completely frustrate the very objective of 
international human rights law to establish rights that operate erga omnes partes despite the 
disparate cultural and political contingencies that characterize different nation-states? This article 
seeks to examine the various concerns, emanating from cultural relativism, raised against 
acceptance of universality of human rights and conclude if they pass muster. It then proceeds to 
chronicle the softening of this aversion in the past decade and flag out challenges ahead for 
ASEAN in holding true to its own AHRD and this will decide whether commitment to the 
universal notion can overcome the obstacle of relative application of the rule of law in ASEAN 
states. 
 
B. SOURCES OF ASEAN STATES’ AVERSION TO UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
In the 1990s, the ASEAN states made clear their reservations to accepting the universality of 
human rights via the Bangkok Declaration in 1993. This beckons the question; why were the 
ASEAN governments more forceful with their dissent against human rights in the 1990s, even 
though many had been the original endorsers of the UDHR Rights in 1948?A few pertinent roots 
of discontent are explored and opportunities at mitigating these difficulties are flagged out; if 
they are indeed legitimate. 
 
I. Pre-eminence of Western Liberal ideology in Human Rights  
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The first factor that accounted for ASEAN‟s aversion to human rights is the impression of 
western moral imperialism engendered by the fact of the pre-eminence of Western liberal 
ideology in the crafting of human rights. The Bangkok Human Rights Declaration of 1993 
explicitly stated the concerns of ASEAN in viewing human rights as a tool of Western neo-
imperialist agenda.
2
 
When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) draft was put to vote, the 
overwhelming support was derived from the international community‟s resolve to protect 
humankind from a repeat of the Second World War, despite the diversity of creeds, races and 
political ideologies.
3
 Thus, the international body of human rights we possess today were a result 
of political will  rather than a consensus on values as commonly believed. Due to a concentration 
of power in certain states, namely the Allied Powers, the eventual outcome was that the 
cornerstone of the international institution of human rights. Specifically, the ideal that the state 
should never violate the inalienable rights of man was more of a construct of Western liberal 
thought, drawing from the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Kant and their contemporaries, 
which was received favourably by Grotius, the Father of international law and encapsulated in 
the American and French Declarations which in turn served as inspiration for the genesis of 
international human rights.
4
  This liberal orientation of the human rights discourse fosters the 
notion that despite its rhetoric of universal appeal, the global world order and the international 
human rights regime possess a tendency towards Western-centricity. 
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However, caution must be taken not to reach any simple conclusion of synonymity between the 
human rights movement and Western liberalism. First, international human rights did not 
develop as an identifiable movement until after World War II; whereas liberalism, in its diverse 
manifestations, claims a much longer history. Second, although human rights evolved from 
values and philosophical presumptions closely associated with the Western liberal tradition, the 
modern international human rights movement can embrace certain other substantive cultural 
values to the extent that they promote human dignity. Finally, no necessary connection exists 
between being a political liberal and respecting all international human rights.
5
Some liberals, 
including self-identified human rights advocates, reject economic, social, and cultural rights; half 
of the so-called “Universal Bill of Human Rights,” as genuine rights.6Other liberals, such as 
those of the Benthamite utilitarian tradition, might regard international human rights as 
“nonsense on stilts” though they might be inclined to concede the usefulness of this nonsense. 
7
Still others might express support for international human rights while maintaining a deep 
commitment to Marxist political theory. 
Also, one should not attempt to extricate and dichotomise completely western liberalism and the 
ASEAN way as liberal theory does permeate aspects of its governance for instance as a 
Framework for ASEAN consensus. Liberal theorists such as John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum 
propounded that respect for the individual affirms that person‟s dignity and equality .As it is with 
individual persons in liberal democratic theory, states, too, treat one another with the same 
respect and equal standing in liberal international relations. In this sense, the notion of respect 
and equality in liberal democratic politics is analogous to the notion of 'state sovereignty', which 
is the normative element of the ASEAN Way. One way that the respect that ASEAN states 
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accord one another is manifested is through their deferential regard for each member-state as an 
equal. Respect, and ultimately equality, is salient features of ASEAN diplomatic practices. That 
ASEAN states are impressed with the same liberal notion of parity is apparent in the constitutive 
documents of ASEAN, the Bangkok Declaration, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and 
finally in the ASEAN Charter, wherein the theme of 'equality' resonates. The Declaration refers 
to “the spirit of equality and partnership” 8 , the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation calls for 
“mutual respect for the  ...  equality... of all nations” 9 and the Charter emphasizes “the 
fundamental importance of equality...”10Indeed, ASEAN diplomacy is predicated on the equal 
standing of all member states, and ultimately, consensus is predicated upon the equality of 
member-states participating in negotiations. 
 
Regardless of how the human rights regime had started out, a supposed under-inclusiveness of 
other political theories can be remedied by a sincere attempt at engaging in the exercise of 
formulating a philosophical justification that is more inclusive of political traditions apart from 
Western liberalism. This may seem to be in the lofty province of philosophers but in fact as 
Henkin commented, „International human rights are not the work of philosophers but of 
politicians and citizens.
11
 Such an attempt is necessary for it will be counter-productive to expect 
non-Western states to assume that universal human rights is self-evident because even by tracing 
the developments of liberal theory and its impact on human rights nowhere can we find explicit 
explanation for the existence of human rights. While the exercise will be difficult because of the 
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value-laden nature of the term and the wide plethora of competing ideologies, such difficulty 
should not preclude an attempt at such an exercise. 
 
II. Preference for Civil and political rights over Socio-Economic and Developmental 
Rights 
Another complaint that Southeast Asian states have is the general preference for civil and 
political rights over the socio-economic and developmental ones despite the fact that such a 
dichotomy is false. The fact that this dichotomy is illusory becomes apparent when one examines 
the early development of international human rights.  Roosevelt‟s wartime exhortation for the 
„four freedoms‟ included the „freedom from want‟, clearly encompassing the socio-economic 
aim of ensuring the provisions of basic necessities. In the early days of the UN, the General 
Assembly has also called upon the UN specialized agencies to give effect to socio-economic 
priorities for acceptable standards of living to be met thus maintaining consistency with the 
UDHR which provides for social, economic and cultural rights alongside the civil-political ones.  
However, the above complaint is generated by the fact that Western states have eschewed this 
indivisibility of human rights and placed greater emphasis on the former over the latter set of 
rights. This trend found its origin in Cold War politics, with the Capitalist West and the 
Communist East taking sides and championing civil-political and socio-economic rights 
respectively. A „generational‟ theory of human rights arose with the civil-political claiming the 
standard of being the „first generation‟ of rights while the socio-economic and cultural  and 
developmental rights were relegated to „second‟ and „third‟ place respectively. This trend 
continues till this day with bias for the former set of rights apparent in the Inter-American and 
European Conventions and the European Social Charter among other documents. This invariably 
leads the Asian states among others to feel that socio-economic and developmental rights they 
have consistently valued are somehow inferior to the ones that Western developed nations have 
traditionally preferred. A corollary concern in this complaint that Asian states have is the 
operation of this preference against their favour, especially the curious phenomenon of how 
democracy has become ubiquitously twinned with human rights. This did not sit comfortably 
with the post-colonial regimes in Southeast Asia; their respective leaderships being variations of 
soft authoritarianism more keen on nation-building than discussion on civil-political liberties.
12
 
 
However, there is hope that human rights will soon revert to its original indivisibility status as 
the stigma attached to socio-economic and developmental rights is being chiselled away. The 
ongoing Millennium Development project undertaken by the UN to eradicate poverty, raise 
living and educational standards and abolish gender discrimination will aid in ensuring 
substantive indivisibility in human rights.
13
 This is due to the fact that not only developing 
countries are  taking measures to achieve this goals; even developed countries facilitate the 
socio-economic development of the developing world by increasing aid contribution and 
abolishing unfair trade practices. Successful mutual cooperation will help to ease tensions over 
democratic promotion in the cause of establishing human rights and it could generate a higher 
regard for socio-economic and developmental exigencies of the developing world and enable the 
rightful standing of such rights alongside the civil-political ones.
14
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 While the West could arguably be seen to impinge on the indivisibility of human rights in favour 
of civil-political rights, the same charge was initially applicable to ASEAN; this times the 
preference leaning in the other extreme. When ASEAN members signed the Bali Concord II in 
2003 to forge a stronger ASEAN community by 2020 through the three pillars of ASEAN, 
Security Community, Economic Community and Socio-cultural Community, no reference is 
made to a theme of human rights.
15
 As the communities were tasked to operate unilaterally, it 
was certain that either one of the 3 pillars would take precedence over human rights or thus it 
was of low priority. To ASEAN‟s credit however, low expectations for ASEAN human rights 
dissipated when the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) pronounced that human rights was to 
be squarely placed within the political development segment of the ASEAN Security 
Community.
16
 
 
There is also an opportunity for ASEAN to take a lead in embracing indivisibility of human 
rights. This arises if ASEAN can make a genuine attempt to truly define „the right to 
development‟ ,a term brandied around often by members of the Bloc, namely what it really 
consists of and how it is to play a role in the international human rights discourse. Exploring this 
human rights-development nexus will in itself be a discipline paving the way for greater 
acceptance of socio-economic rights. Encouragement of state practice in allowing human rights 
to take root by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and aid from AICHR in helping to 
define the right to development as experienced in the ASEAN context of human rights and 
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development will help shape the requisite opinio juris that could serve as a basis for making the 
right to development a substantive universal right in the future and not a culturally peculiar one.  
The ongoing Millennium Development Goals project already provides a ripe opportunity for 
such an attempt. 
 
III.  ‘Asian Values’ Debate 
During the economic ascendancy of the 5 Asian Economic Tigers and partly as a reaction to 
Western triumphalism at the end of the Cold War , the articulation of  distinct „Asian values 
„ came into vogue. This was particularly advanced by „strongman‟ soft authoritarian leaders such 
as Mahathir Mohamed of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. It posits that Asian 
societies valued communitarian values over individual rights i.e. the obligations of Asian 
individuals to their communities and nations were more important than their personal rights. This 
stands in stark contrast to the individual-centric western liberal ideology that permeated the 
human rights movement at the onset. Such a worldview would permit the curtailment of civil-
political rights in favour of public goods such as peace and stability that facilitated their 
emphasis on socio-economic development. Other Asian nations, including other members of 
ASEAN and even China soon adopted this lexicon as well. Even though the „Asian Values‟ 
debate has died down with the departure of the leadership in various ASEAN countries that led 
that debate, it is still appropriate to examine serious criticisms to such a notion of „Asian Values‟ 
lest remnants of this argument get resonance down the road. 
 
Firstly, the politically charged nature of this debate directly lead to the adoption of a position in 
the debate  that ran afoul of the warning from the AAA in 1947 to recognize cultural pluralism. 
Some proponents of Asian Values went a step further and start advocating the superiority of one 
model of another. This led to mutual accusations of hubris which did little to answer the question 
posed in the introduction of this article. The way the debate had been framed also presupposed a 
zero-sum game between communitarian and individual objectives; a trade-off that is potentially 
illusory if one refers back to the indivisibility of human rights described earlier. 
 
Secondly, the claim of a monolithic set of Asian values across the most diverse region in the 
world has been subject to much scrutiny. As An-Na'im notes, within a single culture, multiple 
perceptions and interpretations of its constitutive shared values subsist. 
17
As such, cultural 
pluralism does not simply refer to disputes between cultures such as between “Islam and the 
West” 18but also within cultures; for instance, cultures internal disagreements among Islamic 
cultural groups and nation-states. Similarly, in the context of the “Asian values” debate, Yash 
Ghai points out that “neither Asian culture nor Asian realities are homogenous throughout the 
continent.” 19Thus, for example, some “Asian values” theorists claim that Confucian cultural 
traditions in East and Southeast Asia create greater popular desire for the social order and 
efficient governance allegedly enabled by authoritarian regimes than for democracy. 
20
But the 
Dalai Lama, a prominent exemplar of the diverse Buddhist traditions of Asia, expresses the view 
that “not only are Buddhism and democracy compatible, they are rooted in a common 
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understanding of the equality and potential of every individual.”21The point here is not that one 
view or the other is correct, but rather that we have no reason to assume that the State-, to whom 
universal human rights law principally applies-, speaks with a monolithic cultural voice. In the 
era of the nation-state, rarely, if ever, do territorial boundaries embrace a single cultural 
tradition?
22
 
 
It has also been questioned whether a State‟s exposition of a preference for „Asian Values‟ can 
be said to represent a true societal consensus on that point. Human rights activists and academics 
alike observe that frequently it is not cultural values that inhibit societies from realizing a legal 
order that respects universal human rights; it is the self-serving manipulation of these values by 
elites.
23
Kofi Annan sums up this proposition aptly during a speech at the Aspen Institute. 
Specifically, he said  one does not‟ need to explain the meaning of human rights to an Asian 
mother or an African father whose son or daughter has been tortured or killed. They understand 
it--tragically--far better than we ever will.”24 Such a disconnect between the leadership and the 
ground is also apparent in civil societies‟ criticism of the AHRD through the Joint submission to 
the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights on the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, including the lack of transparency and failure to consult them. More crucially, 
many of the groups championed by civil society were excluded from the AHRD. Clearly, the 
civil societies in ASEAN countries had very different aspiration for human rights discourse and 
were not content with accepting the „Asian values‟ as a justificatory theory.  
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C. Softening of the ASEAN stance on Human Rights 
 
I. A brief Genealogy of an ASEAN human rights mechanism 
Notwithstanding the various factors that have influenced ASEAN„s slow reception to the 
universality of human rights, it is important to acknowledge that ASEAN has made significant 
progress towards just such an acceptance. Amidst the „Asian Values‟ debate and the defiant 
posturing during the Bangkok Declaration in the 1990s,ASEAN member states had already 
begun to take tentative steps towards the idea of instituting human rights regionally in line with 
universal ideals embodied by UN norms while at the same time respecting cultural subjectivities. 
As early as 1993, during the 26
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the ASEAN foreign ministers 
declared that the regional grouping should „consider the establishment of an appropriate regional 
mechanism on human rights‟ to support the Vienna World Declaration on Human Rights 
concluded that same year.
25
 In ASEAN‟s blueprint for the future, ASEAN Vision 2020, 
announced in 1997,socio-economic initiatives related to human rights could be inferred from the 
commitment to make ASEAN „a community of caring societies‟ and to „address issues of 
unequal economic development, poverty and socio-economic disparities‟ by 2020.26 While this 
was not couched in human rights language, it displayed a cognizance of such rights specifically 
the concern for human welfare and the resolve to rectify unjust situations. The following 
year,1998, was a milestone for human right consciousness in ASEAN as the term „human rights‟ 
entered the official lexicon in ASEAN diplomacy in the context of a reaffirmation by the 
ASEAN foreign ministers of the pledge made in 1993 towards creating a human rights 
mechanism. Thereafter, ASEAN‟s collective human rights-related undertakings grew 
                                                             
25
 Joint Communiqué of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 23-24 July 1993, para.16. 
26
 ASEAN Vision 2020, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 15 December 1997. 
concurrently with human rights consciousness, a trend epitomized by the ratification of a slew of 
conventions and declarations such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women(CEDAW) and Convention for the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
 
The turning point for the human rights in ASEAN was spelt out in the Vientiane Action 
Programme in 2004 which expressly provided for action on human rights by 2010.
27
 This would 
culminate in the inauguration in 2009 of the  ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) created to promote and protect human rights in the region the ASEAN way in 
conformity with the principles in the ASEAN Charter; principles such as sovereignty and non-
interference. A formal declaration of ASEAN member states‟ commitment to promoting and 
upholding human rights, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) was adopted in 
November 2012.  
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II. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration :Rhetorical commitment to universal human 
rights  
At first blush, it may seem that the circumscription of the AICHR by principle of non-
interference via the Terms of Reference (TOR) would support an inference that ASEAN has not 
shifted from predicating its commitment to human rights on cultural peculiarities and thus 
maintaining its aversion of the universality of human rights in the1990s. However, in response to 
UN rights Chief Navi Pillay‟s criticism that rrestrictions in the name of "regional and national 
particularities" would serve as loopholes in adherence to international standards among other 
critical comments, ASEAN chief Surin Pitsuwan announced that the bloc‟s foreign ministers 
made an amendment to the text which affirmed that ASEAN nations would "implement the 
declaration in accordance to the international human rights declarations and standards”. As such, 
it can be argued that this gesture, coupled with the softening of ASEAN‟s aversion to human 
rights displayed over the past two decades, signifies at the very least a formal acceptance of the 
universality of human rights. 
 
D. CHALLENGES IN BEING FILIAL TO THE AHRD PLEDGE: RELATIVE 
RECEPTION OF UNIVERSAL OBLIGATIONS ON THE GROUND : WILL 
FORMAL DECLARATION TRANSLATE TO ENSURING RULE OF LAW ON 
THE GROUND?  
While a formal commitment to universal human rights is made by the AHRD, steadfastness to 
such a committed will be predicated on ASEAN‟s ability to deal with relativism in enforcement 
of a universal obligation. Such relative protection of human rights by the rule of law stems from 
a few factors which are flagged out herein namely the relative reception of these universal 
obligations on the ground. 
 
I.   Need  to ensure implementation on the ground at the State level: Creating and 
respecting National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
It is vital that human rights norms be institutionalized at the State level if commitment to human 
rights is to go beyond a public relations stunt. Two questions must be posed to two classes of 
ASEAN states. For the states without NHRIs, how can they be convinced or muster enough 
political will to establish human rights commissions? The main impetus must be domestically 
driven before external expertise can be rendered, for no international actor can compel the state 
to do so against its will. At this juncture, it is encouraging to note that Cambodia, though no 
fixed timeline is given, is preparing to establish its national commission
28
 and Vietnam too has 
vowed that it will not be the last ASEAN member to establish an NHRI.
29
 The second question 
pertains to ASEAN states once they establish or if they already have NHRIs; how would they 
maintain the independence necessary for real effectiveness. Here, it must be noted that NHRIs 
are stuck between a rock and a hard place in having to straddle the contentious position between 
civil society and the state. As can be observed, the four NHRIs in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines are frequently hampered due to these competing obligations.  For instance, 
the ousted Thai Premier Thaksin Shinawatra condemned Thailand‟s NHRI for its scathing report 
of the „War on Drugs‟ in Southern Thailand.30 Conversely, in Indonesia, while acknowledging 
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the shortcomings of the NHRI, the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC) 
has faulted NGOs for not recognizing the merits achieved by Komnas HAM.
31
 On top of this 
balancing exercise, NHRIs have to strive to be impartial and be neither written off as a state 
apologist nor overly supportive of NGOs and face resistance from the state. To help mitigate 
these already significant difficulties, the ASEAN states must understand and respect the requisite 
powers and autonomies of these bodies. 
 
II.  The need to grapple with subjectivity in interpretation and implementation of 
universal human rights obligations brought about by genuine differences in 
culture.  
It needs to be recognized that apart from the vitriol over the „Asian Values‟ debate, dilemmas 
that arise within different cultural frameworks can also be genuine and legitimate. It is 
foreseeable that different cultural thresholds can be problematic in what children‟s‟ rights in the 
CRC really comprise. For instance, Singapore read Articles 19 and 37 of the CRC as not 
prohibiting the „judicious application of corporal punishment in the best interests of the child‟. 
Similarly, a cultural and ideological clash on the role of women is apparent with respect to the 
CEDAW. For instance, complications arise where the Islamic framework of Syariah law 
intersects with human rights on the issue of gender roles and property ownership.
32
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There is also concern about the subjectivity of terms such as „public morality‟ and segments of 
civil society have called for the removal of such terms from the AHRD. It is argued that the use 
of traditional lenses to interpret human rights will invariably undermine women, LGBT and other 
sexual minorities as they are often the subjects of standards of morality especially when they 
transgress patriarchal and hetero-normative standards. A few instances of how forms of 
discrimination and violence could be justified by invoking public morality include the following. 
Despite a ban in 2006, Indonesian girls in rural communities still undergo female genital 
mutilation as a sign of chastity. In the Philippines, it is easier to charge a married woman with 
adultery than a man who has to be caught living with another woman. In some parts of Cambodia 
and Laos, women are obliged by their culture to give birth in the forest without birth attendants, 
risking both the lives of mothers and infants. 
 
Contributing to morality‟s subjectivity is the fact that the term has not been defined in any 
standard-setting international human rights document. Such a proposed omission of „morality‟ 
from the AHRD will be of little adverse consequence.  It would not prohibit states from invoking 
their own constitutional clauses relating to morality, from utilizing moral arguments that sustain 
human rights or provide a positive obligation on states.
33
 
 
 
III.  Under-inclusiveness of AHRD undermines its commitment to universal 
standards 
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The AHRD has clear exclusions of certain communities in ASEAN. These communities are 
people who are indigenous to the country, people with diverse sexual orientations and gender 
identities and undocumented workers. This lack of protection in the AHRD is counter-intuitive to 
embracing universality as it has marginalised certain communities by exclusions; particularly 
vulnerable groups who are most in need of such protection in the first place. As such, it leaves 
the management of tangible problems these groups face to the prerogative of the states. 
 
With regard to LGBT communities, it is unclear whether any amount of Ministerial Forums will 
breach a broad cultural divide on the issue. Acceptance of LGBT communities range from 
toleration in Thailand to criminalisation of homosexual conduct by 6 ASEAN countries no less. 
On such an issue, it is unclear if a consensus can ever be reached and as such a top-down 
approach may have been more appropriate. 
 
Experts from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called on 
ASEAN leaders to consider in their declaration the issues of statelessness, the right to seek and 
to enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries, and the international customary law 
principle of “non-refoulement,” which would guard against the return of people to countries 
where, for example, they might be subjected to torture. In particular, the recent plight of the 
Rohingyas comes to mind when examining this stark omission from the AHRD. 
 
Lastly, the plight of migrant workers, an enormous demographic in ASEAN, should not be left to 
the prerogative of the International Labour Organization but should instead be viewed as an 
opportunity for ASEAN to assert itself and build human rights credentials. 
 IV. Potential abuse of national security as a Trojan horse to curb human rights 
There is palpable fear amongst NGOs in the region that the Declaration, with the national 
security exception to compliance, will have the converse effect of legitimising ongoing human 
rights violations such as the violence between Buddhist and Muslims in Rakhine state in Burma 
and land rights violations and forced evictions in Cambodia. By this caveat, the declaration also 
potentially subverts the concept of human rights by defining them through the lens of national 
governments instead of affirming them as the absolute and irrevocable rights of individuals. This 
situation has not been helped by the poor example set by the major proponents of human rights 
i.e. the West. 
 
Poor precedence in this respect has been set by the failure of the West to respect its own human 
rights values in the face of national security threats post-September 11. While the Obama 
Administration has put an end to the overt and sanctioned use of torture in American political 
prisons, human rights abuses in the name of national security are still prevalent. The National 
Defence Authorization Act of 2012 gives the US military extraordinary powers to detain and 
imprison anyone, including any American citizen, that it deems to be a threat to national security, 
thereby setting aside the bedrock legal principle of habeas corpus.
34
 The American drone 
programme targeted US citizens accused of involvement in terrorist activities and "high value 
terrorists" for assassination abroad and, along the way, killed hundreds of innocent civilian 
                                                             
34 Charlie Savage, "Obama Drops Veto Threat over Military Authorization Bill After Revisions", The New York Times, 14 
December 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/us/politics/obama-wont-veto-military-authorization-bill.html>. 
bystanders.
35
 These transgressions render the United States hypocritical at best as it continues to 
claim that the promotion of "American values" of human rights and democracy is a major focus 
of its engagement with the Asia-Pacific
36
  and the US State Department continues to issue annual 
reports on the human rights performances of other countries in the world.
37
Therefore, states 
which seek to be at the forefront of human rights advocacy must be cautious of their impact on 
the external international human rights environment that could undermine the human rights 
agenda. 
 
ASEAN states will have to inspire confidence amongst NGOs and its populace that it will 
exercise the state apparatus responsibly and transparently. Yet, as the face of threats to national 
security shifts to more insidious forms such as terrorism, there are no easy answers as to how 
ASEAN states, with a fraction of the resources and infrastructure of the West, can combat such 
threats without infringing upon Human Rights.  
 
V. Inherent structure of the ASEAN process  as an obstacle to enforcement on 
Human Rights 
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36  Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", Foreign Policy (November 
2011),<bttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/ll/americas_pacific_century>. 
 
37 U.S. Department of State Human Rigbts Reports, <bttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/ 
brrpt/>. 
The greatest challenge that the ADHR faces in a universal implementation of Human Rights is 
the decision making process of ASEAN. This process has been described as “informal and 
trusting”,38 and the only rule that is strictly adhered to, is the one of non-interference. 
The process by which decisions are made, is best described in the following extract: 
 The central norm of the ASEAN Way is the principle of respect for sovereignty. 
It is from this norm that other norms and practices emanate. The second element … is the 
forms of communication, which are embodied in the practices of consultation and 
dialogue. Finally, the third element is decision-making through consensus or the 
Consensus Rule. These elements are formally embedded into ASEAN diplomatic practices 
through the ASEAN Charter”.39 
In practical terms, this means that should a member state be guilty of a Human Rights violation, 
ASEAN as an institution can intervene only when a fellow member state feels sufficiently 
strongly about that Human Right violation to put at risk her political goodwill to raise this 
allegation at the ASEAN level meetings. With the greatest respect to Human Rights, they are 
often not the most pressing of issues that ASEAN member states are currently facing. Given the 
political pressure placed on the ASEAN state leaders to induce economic prosperity and ensure 
regional security (amongst other concerns), Human Rights issues may very well be relegated to 
the sidelines for future discussions, It has been academically noted that the human rights 
elements of the Charter seem incongruent with „traditional‟ understandings of ASEAN norms, 
                                                             
38 Antolik, Michael. ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation. ME Sharpe Inc, 1990. 
 
39  TOBIA, IAN NICCOLO V. "Confessing to the Politicization of the ASEAN Human Rights Agenda: A Case for the 
Modification of the Consensus Rule."Thammasat Review Vol. 15, Special Issue,(2012): 25. 
 
particularly sovereignty and non-interference (which were reaffirmed in the Charter: Article 2a). 
Moreover, they pertain directly to issues traditionally considered too „sensitive‟ for official 
dialogue, and seem to suggest that ASEAN will now pay more attention to the domestic affairs 
of its member states.
40
  
 
In addition, ASEAN employs diplomacy in a fashion that is different from western concepts of 
international relations like the EU. No minutes are published for ASEAN meetings, transparency 
in the decision-making and dispute resolution process is non-existent, and there is minimal 
involvement of civil society. Such an arrangement has been proven to allow speedy resolutions 
of problems when they threaten the economic or political livelihood of all member states.
41
 
However, questions remain on how such a system can extend towards convincing each member 
state to implement the ADHR to raise the levels of Human Rights within ASEAN. NGOs, a big 
driver of Human Rights globally, will be unable to lobby various agendas, or keep watch on the 
proceedings of ASEAN meetings vis-à-vis Human Rights issues. 
 
Of course, an astute observer can point to the fact that ASEAN has taken into account such 
limitations, and made the necessary arrangements. The AICHR was recently set up, to create a 
regional human rights mechanism to govern the implementation of Human Rights within 
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41  Emmers, Ralf, and See Seng Tan. The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: A Failure in Practice. S. 
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ASEAN. Given the tension between traditional ASEAN understandings and the AHRD, it 
remains to be seen what ASEAN will do. Should member states continue the staunch adherence 
of most member states to the non-interference principle, and the notion that the internal affairs of 
member states are not to be scrutinized or criticized, then the AHRD, no matter how well drafted, 
will be ineffective in bringing change. The net result is that the effectiveness of the AHDR 
would be hampered by the very nature of ASEAN as an institution.  
 
E.  CONCLUSION   
Overall, it is clear that ASEAN has transcended its reservations of the past decades and this is for 
the better given the veracity of some of these reservations. Presently, much of the prescriptive 
trajectory of ASEAN‟s institutionalization of human rights remains conjecture. There is a 
normative, formalistic accord for the universality of human rights juxtaposed against the reality 
of relative reception on the ground. There will be much discourse as rhetoric is translated to 
action but at least with the AICHR and the AHRD, the glass is at least half full. The ball is now 
in the court of the ASEAN states. 
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